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Abstract 
This paper investigates the role of banking supervision in controlling bank risk. Banking 
supervision is measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions). 
Our results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, 
while the relationship between sanctions and risk appears to be linear and negative. We 
also consider the combined effect of effective supervision and banking regulation (in the 
form of capital and market discipline requirements) on bank risk. We find that effective 
supervision and market discipline requirements are important and complementary 
mechanisms in reducing bank fragility. This is in contrast to capital requirements, which 
prove to be rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher 
volume of on-site audits and sanctions.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial turmoil that commenced in 2007 has stimulated substantial research 
aimed at identifying the reasons behind the crisis and at proposing recovery measures. A 
handful of interrelated explanations have been offered, one of the most interesting of which 
involves supervisory inertia (e.g., Blanchard, 2008; Caprio et al., 2008). This paper 
examines empirically the relationship between supervisory effectiveness and bank risk.1 
The main novelty of our work is that we measure supervisory effectiveness in terms of 
enforcement actions (sanctions) and on-site audits, and how these affect the level of bank 
risk in bank portfolios.  
Our research was inspired by the works of Jackson (2007), Jackson and Roe (2009), 
and Coffee (2007). More specifically, we endorse the observation made by these studies 
that employing information on sanctions and on-site examinations (enforcement outputs) 
offers the opportunity to capture supervisory effectiveness in containing bank risk more 
directly and accurately than does the use of data on enforcement inputs, i.e., regulatory 
budgets and staffing. 
Indeed, according to the second pillar of Basel II, on-site inspections constitute an 
essential component of supervisory review, in concert with the application of appropriate 
sanctions where breaches of law are revealed (Basel Committee, 2006). On-site 
inspections, in particular, enable the timely detection of management deficiencies and 
provide independent verification of both the quality of the internal control systems and the 
reliability of information produced by banks (Basel Committee, 2002). Therefore, it comes 
                                                 
1 Our work distinguishes between banking supervision and regulation. Regulation encompasses formal rules 
that are adopted by an official public authority (law-on-the-books). Banking supervision comprises the on-
going monitoring of law-on-the-books and the imposition of remedial measures in case of violations (Basel 
Committee, 2002). 
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as no surprise that on-site examinations and sanctions are considered essential tools for 
ensuring the stability of the system (Quintyn and Taylor, 2002).2  
In this context, we build a new panel dataset that contains information on on-site 
audits and sanctions for 17 countries over the period 1998-2008. This period begins after 
the Asian and Russian financial crises and ends with the recent financial crisis having 
already unfolded. Thus, it provides ample room to identify whether the effectiveness of 
banking supervision is related to the increased risk-taking by banks that has been observed 
in recent years. This paper examines first and foremost whether on-site audits and 
enforcement actions have a negative and direct impact on bank risk. Put differently, we ask 
whether supervisors who inspect banks more regularly and adopt a more forceful 
enforcement attitude are better positioned to restrain bank risk. 
Deviating from most of the contemporary literature that examines separately the 
impact that each of the three Basel II components has on banking stability/performance, we 
also examine the relationship between supervisory effectiveness, on the one hand, and 
capital adequacy requirements and market discipline-transparency, on the other hand, in 
shaping bank risk. Our research tests the rather neglected principle set out by the Basel 
Committee (Basel Committee, 2006) that market discipline (Pillar 3) supplements both 
minimum capital adequacy requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process 
(Pillar 2). We are motivated by the concern that the proxies used by empirical research for 
supervisory quality so far rely heavily on law-on-the-books, as opposed to actual 
supervisory alertness (e.g., La Porta et al., 2006). Moreover, we suspect that differences in 
                                                 
2 A potential drawback of our measure is that the use of data on audits and sanctions does not capture 
“supervisory efficiency” in an economic sense, because the decision to intervene is affected by a number of 
factors not considered in the paper, for example, supervisors’ private interests (they may earn fees from 
exams) and cost considerations concerning inspections/sanctions. 
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the stringency of law enforcement may constitute an interesting explanatory factor for the 
diverse empirical outcomes concerning the impact of capital and transparency requirements 
on bank risk-taking (e.g., VanHoose, 2007; Alexandre et al., 2010). 
Our estimation results indicate that the impact of on-site examinations on various 
measures of bank risk is non-linear. In contrast, enforcement actions exert a linear negative 
impact on risk. Therefore, it is quite clear that direct measures of supervisory effectiveness 
are negatively related to bank risk. Turning our attention to the interplay among banking 
regulation, supervision, and risk, we make two appealing inferences for regulatory and 
supervisory policy-making. First, it appears that transparency regulation exercises a 
significant disciplinary effect upon bank risk, both directly and when viewed in 
combination with effective banking supervision. Second, our results fail to establish a 
similar correlation for capital adequacy requirements in general. Capital regulation, either 
directly or through its effective supervision, does not curtail bank risk but only affects 
those banks that hold a level of capital very close to the minimum capital adequacy 
requirements (see also Berger et al., 2010).  
The existing literature has so far attempted to gauge the quality of banking 
supervision in a rather indirect manner. Proxies for enforcement quality involve the official 
attributes of supervisory authorities, such as independence and scope of powers (e.g., La 
Porta et al., 2006), or the degree of corruption and political freedom reflecting the quality 
of government efficiency in general (e.g., Noy, 2004). However, because they place undue 
weight on law-on-the-books, these indices produce less precise estimations. Surveys and 
questionnaires that involve supervisory authorities as respondents have also been used to 
assess supervisory quality (e.g., Barth et al., 2001, 2004 and 2008). Though they provide an 
excellent proxy for the regulatory and supervisory environment (law-on-the-books), these 
measures may be prone to two limitations. First, they are affected by the subjective 
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judgment of the respondents (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008, p. 515). Second, due to lack of a 
complete set of historical data, the work of Barth et al. is based upon information that is 
available for only three points in time and, hence, displays a relatively more static 
character.  
To the same end, the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Program (FSAP) has been 
examining the degree of compliance with the 25 Basel Committee Core Principles (BCPs) 
for effective banking supervision (Basel Committee, 2006b). Again, however, several 
limitations emerge: letter-of-law evaluations supplemented by the opinions of experts 
neglect the factor of actual implementation and introduce an aspect of subjectivity, while 
the inherently vague content of the BCPs undermines the reliability of the compliance 
testing. Finally, Neyapti and Dincer (2005) examine whether countries have adopted laws 
covering the areas of supervisory interest indicated by the BCPs and the related literature 
(e.g., capital, lending, ownership, management, reporting, corrective action, supervision, 
deposit insurance); contrary to our work, however, these studies do not attempt to assess 
whether and to what extent these laws are actually implemented.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and forms the research questions. Section 3 describes the sample and variables to 
be used in the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we analyze the direct impact of banking 
supervision on risk. Section 5 considers the combined effect of banking supervision and 
banking regulations on risk. Section 6 concludes the paper.       
 
2. Related Literature and Theoretical Underpinnings 
In this section we offer a brief review of the literature associated with our work and 
we set out the main research questions.   
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2.1 THE DISCIPLINARY EFFECT OF BANKING SUPERVISORY ENFORCEMENT 
Wu (1969) was among the first to note that the criticism by bank examiners of 
business loans is reasonably accurate, thus offering a good ex ante measure of loan quality. 
Wu’s statement has been corroborated ever since by several studies focusing on the 
predictive and corrective character of bank examinations regarding the quality of loans 
(e.g., Berger et al., 2000; DeYoung et al., 2001; Bhattacharya et al., 2002; Gunther and 
Moore, 2003). All these authors tend to reach the general conclusion that on-site audits 
exercise a disciplinary power upon banks in three ways. First, they force the production of 
more accurate financial reports. Second, they enhance market discipline through public 
disclosure of audit findings. And third, they improve supervisory discipline, as the 
auditors’ discoveries may form the basis for the application of remedial actions by 
supervisory authorities.  
 The empirical research focusing directly on the impact of sanctions on banking 
discipline has been limited. From a theoretical standpoint, the materialization of legal 
standards (law-on-the-books) through the employment of enforcement actions is viewed as 
the means that gives the law “teeth to bite” and offers meaning to the otherwise “blank 
letter” of legal rules (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Swindle (1995) and DeYoung 
et al. (2001), among others, suggest that the positive relationship between the frequency of 
on-site audits and banking discipline is due to the fact that the information gained by 
supervisors following examinations enables them to apply appropriate remedial measures 
on imprudent banks. A variation of the above argument is that on-site audits may transmit 
“regulatory discipline information” to the market. In other words, an unanticipated change 
of rating accompanied by regulatory restrictions or reliefs may affect the bank value. In the 
event of a rating downgrade and concomitant introduction of regulatory restrictions, the 
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value of the bank is likely to decrease, thus exerting disciplining power (Berger and 
Davies, 1998). 
 All in all, the above research suggests that the frequency of on-site audits and the 
number of supervisory sanctions should be positively correlated with banking discipline. 
On this basis, the first question (Question 1) asked in this study is: Are the quality of 
supervisory enforcement, dictated as the number of on-site audits and sanctions, and bank 
risk indeed negatively associated?  
   
2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKING STABILITY, SUPERVISORY 
EFFECTIVENESS, AND BANKING REGULATION 
Besides exploring the direct effect of enforcement on bank risk, our work attempts 
to offer a more integrated approach of the three Basel II ingredients, by studying whether it 
is the effective supervision (Pillar 2) of capital adequacy (Pillar 1) and transparency (Pillar 
3) regulation that has an effect on bank risk. From this perspective, our work appears to be 
related to the literature that focuses on the relationship between banking regulation (in the 
form of capital adequacy and disclosure requirements) and banking fragility.  
A considerable part of this research shares the view that increased transparency and 
the associated enhanced market discipline contribute significantly to banking stability by 
(i) limiting informational asymmetries, (ii) boosting private monitoring, (iii) facilitating 
supervisory oversight, and (iv) forcing banks to adopt more prudent risk-taking behavior 
(e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). Other views, however, seem rather 
unconvinced, offering at least two reasons for which information disclosure may 
undermine banking system stability. First, and considering that the returns of banks are 
positively correlated, increased disclosure of information may cause depositors to overreact 
to adverse information about other banks and initiate a run on their bank (e.g., Chen and 
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Hasan, 2006). Second, compliance with information disclosure regulation entails not only 
direct (e.g., establishing and operating efficient information production and verification 
systems) and indirect (e.g., appropriation of disclosed information by rivals) costs, but it 
may also lead to pervasive free-riding of monitoring information and, by implication, to 
reduced profit margins (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2002). 
 Turning to the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk, the 
conventional view holds that capital requirements serve as a risk-mitigating mechanism 
that forces banks to put more of their own funds at risk and internalize possible losses. This 
view has been challenged, however, by a substantial portion of the theoretical literature. 
Research outcomes diverge as they appear to depend on whether: (a) banks are examined 
as value- or utility-maximizing firms operating in complete or incomplete markets and 
within a purely static or a more dynamic framework; (b) the limited liability of bank 
shareholders and the behavior-distorting effects of deposit insurance are fully considered; 
and (c) information asymmetries and monitoring incentives on the asset side as well as 
banks’ ownership and market structure are appropriately accounted for.3  
A central and common assumption underlying this theoretical literature is the 
ability of supervisors to enforce capital regulation. We assert that this conjecture deserves 
more attention as a potentially decisive factor in explaining the diverse empirical results. In 
particular, effective enforcement of capital requirements may constitute the key incentive 
mechanism for banks to curtail their portfolio and leverage risk, as well as reduce the value 
of their deposit insurance put option (see e.g., Flannery, 1989; Milne, 2002). Moreover, 
supervisory forbearance may be viewed as a form of government subsidy, inducing banks 
to increase their risky assets (Allen and Rai, 1996; Galloway et al., 1997).  
                                                 
3 For a literature review see VanHoose (2007), Behr et al. (2010) and references therein. 
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In this context, we find it interesting and novel to examine the combined effect of 
supervisory enforcement (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions) and banking regulation (i.e., 
capital and transparency requirements) on bank risk. Thus, our second research question 
(Question 2) is: Is the combined effect of effective supervisory enforcement and banking 
regulation, in the form of capital and transparency requirements, important in shaping bank 
risk? 
 
3. Empirical Model and Data 
3.1 ESTIMATED EQUATIONS AND DATA COVERAGE 
The following equation illustrates the direct relationship between banking 
supervision and bank risk: 
1 1 2 3 1 4 5it it t t t it t itr r audits sanctions reg b c uα δ β β β β β− −= + + + + + + +   (1) 
Here the risk variable r of bank i at time t is written as a function of the lagged dependent 
variable; the time-dependent variables audits and sanctions that correspond to the number 
of on-site examinations and sanctions per bank in each year (in logarithmic terms), 
respectively; the indices that reflect the regulatory conditions in the banking systems 
examined, reg; a vector of bank-level control variables, b; variables that capture the 
institutional and macroeconomic conditions common to all banks, c; and the error term, u. 
In addition, to answer the second question set out in Section 2 concerning the 
combined effect of supervisory effectiveness and banking regulations on bank risk, we 
consider the following specification: 
1 1 2 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 7
*
      *
it it t t t t t
t t it t it
r r audits sanctions reg audits reg
sanctions reg b c u
α δ β β β β
β β β
− −
−
= + + + + + +
+ + +
−          (2) 
We build a dataset that encompasses information on sanctions and on-site bank 
examinations for 17 countries over the period 1998-2008. The countries are Australia, 
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Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. We 
chose these countries based on the availability of data on examinations and sanctions, as 
well as on the fact that they are representative of banking systems with different legal, 
regulatory, and institutional origins. Bank risk is captured at the bank level, which yields 
disaggregated information on individual bank strategies.  
Table I shows information by country on the average number of supervised banks 
during the sample period and the actual number of banks for which the risk indicators are 
constructed. We use the legal definition of the term “bank” in each of the sample countries 
and conclude the deposit function constitutes a common denominator of all descriptions. 
Our data on the number of supervised banks cover (a) domestically established banks 
(home country depository institutions) and (b) domestic operations of foreign banks (e.g., 
branches, representative offices, subsidiaries of foreign banks). In contrast, branches of 
domestic banks are not counted as separate banks. All data for the bank-level variables are 
collected from Bankscope. We limit the empirical analysis to the unconsolidated 
statements of banks to reduce the possibility of introducing aggregation bias in the results. 
We included in the sample only the banks supervised by the national supervisory 
authorities (listed in Table I) so that our sample includes those banks upon which audits 
and sanctions were imposed. The percentage of banks in the sample to the total number of 
banks supervised is approximately 74%. A number of mergers and acquisitions took place 
during the sample period; these are taken into account in our dataset so as to avoid 
duplication. The data were also reviewed for reporting errors or other inconsistencies (zero 
or negative values for the variables used), and some observations are excluded accordingly 
(for more details, see Appendix and the supplement to the paper). 
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3.2 ON-SITE EXAMINATIONS AND SANCTIONS 
Data on on-site audits and supervisory enforcement actions were obtained from the 
annual reports produced by the national supervisory authorities responsible for the conduct 
of banking supervision (Table I lists the supervisory authorities for each country). The 
actual variables employed are constructed as the number of on-site audits and sanctions per 
bank in the supervisory jurisdiction in each country per year. The panel is unbalanced and 
consists of a maximum of 159 observations for audits and 155 for sanctions (Table I 
provides details for the time span for each country and the supplement to the paper 
provides the full sample).  
This is the first study that employs a panel of cross-country data for these variables, 
and in doing so it portrays actual banking supervisory effectiveness. Our dataset thus 
reflects the intensity of supervision applied to the banking sector as a whole and is intended 
to serve as a novel “banking supervision index” representing an aggregate measure of 
supervisory effectiveness. To address potential concerns over the comparability of data 
across countries we need to make two fundamental clarifications in advance concerning the 
collection and elaboration of information on sanctions, on-site audits, and number of 
supervised banks per country.  
First, we consider that a basic, common understanding has been developed among 
sample countries concerning the meaning and objectives of “on-site audits” and 
“sanctions”. All sample countries have been reported to adopt the BCPs and thus share a 
uniform perception over the fundamental principles elaborated therein, including Principles 
20 and 23 concerning on-site audits and enforcement actions (Basel Committee, 2006c, pp. 
32-33, 37-38). In this context, we are not concerned with the criteria (lenient or more 
stringent) that national supervisors employ in deciding to apply a sanction or conduct an 
audit, but with the actual outcome of banking supervision (number of audits and sanctions). 
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Put differently, what we explore is how the implementation of/compliance with two of the 
BCPs, that is, Principles 20 and 23, affects bank risk and interplays with capital and 
transparency requirements in shaping banking behavior. 
Second, our analysis employs data on supervisory sanctions that are both directly 
related (e.g., violation of capital/liquidity requirements, breaches of large exposure 
limitations and internal organization standards) and not directly related (e.g., breaches of 
consumer protection law) to the banks’ safety and soundness. Thus, with the exception of 
Australia where, as explained further below, the competent prudential supervisor is solely 
responsible for monitoring compliance with safety and soundness regulation, we collect 
data on the overall supervisory alertness for all sample countries. We did so because, as 
already underlined, we are interested in capturing the general disciplinary effect that 
supervisory sanctions exert upon banks’ behavior. Moreover, from a purely technical-
practical perspective, specific data on the violations of safety and soundness regulation are 
unavailable, with the exception of three countries (i.e., United States, Australia, 
Luxembourg). Thus, to verify and further support our inference on the correlation between 
enforcement actions and bank risk, we conduct additional analyses for the United States, 
Australia, and Luxembourg, where more information is offered on the legal basis behind 
supervisory sanctions.4  
 
3.3 BANK RISK 
We proxy bank risk by a number of measures that have been extensively used in the 
literature. First, we use as our primary measure the Z-index, which represents a universal 
measure of bank risk or insolvency risk (see e.g., Boyd et al., 2006 and Laeven and Levine, 
                                                 
4 The ratio of sanctions related to safety and soundness to total sanctions is 32% in Australia, 30% in 
Luxembourg and 19% in the USA. 
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2009). It is defined as ( ) / ( )Z ROA EA ROAσ= + , where ROA is the rate of return on 
assets (ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets), EA is the ratio of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) 
is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. To calculate σ(ROA) 
at time t, we use data from the two previous years (i.e., t-1, t-2) and verify that using three 
or four lags gives very similar results. A higher Z indicates that a bank is farther from 
insolvency. Since Z is highly skewed, we use its natural logarithm, which is normally 
distributed. In our sample Z obtains a mean value equal to 3.45. The highest average Z-
scores are reported in 2006 due to the high profitability of banks in that year.  
Second, we use the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, denoted as NPL 
(see Fernández and González, 2005, and the references therein). NPL reflects the quality of 
bank assets, i.e., the potential adverse exposure to earnings and asset market values due to 
deteriorating asset quality. Because a portion of non-performing loans will result in losses 
for the bank, a high value for this ratio is unwanted. A potential criticism on the value of 
this measure is that it may better capture risk taken in the past and not changes in the 
riskiness of the bank.5 Therefore, we carry out sensitivity analysis by also using changes in 
NPL as the dependent variable. We obtain the data for this variable from Bankscope. Table 
II presents the descriptive statistics. The mean value equals 0.029, with countries such as 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hong Kong, and Korea obtaining high values at the beginning of the 
sample period6 and countries such as Australia and Germany having low NPL ratios. The 
                                                 
5 This is a criticism that does not concern the Z-index as much, because changes in bank riskiness are 
captured through the variance component of this index. Furthermore, the Z-index, as a measure of insolvency 
risk, concerns primarily the longer-term probability of bank failure and, in our context, how this probability 
relates to supervisory effectiveness.   
6 The transition economies of our sample inherited a high volume of non-performing loans from the old 
centralized regime. For Korea and Hong Kong the 1997 financial crisis is responsible for the high values of 
non-performing loans observed at the beginning of the period. 
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correlation of the Z-score with NPL is negative and takes a value of -0.671, while low Z-
scores are reported in countries with high credit risk (e.g., the Asian countries in the first 
years of our sample and some transition countries). 
In sensitivity analysis, we confirm our baseline results by using additional measures 
of risk, such as the ratio of risky assets to total assets (RA) and its change from the previous 
period or the simple volatility of the return on assets σ(ROA). σ(ROA) is useful in 
separating the volatility of assets from the volatility of leverage in the Z-index (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). RA reflects the riskiness of bank portfolios at any point in time and the 
extent to which banks hold illiquid assets. Banks’ risky assets include all bank assets 
except cash, government securities (at market value), and balances due from other banks. 
In other words, all bank assets subject to change in value due to changes in market 
conditions or changes in credit quality at various re-pricing opportunities are included as 
risky assets. Naturally, an increase in RA demonstrates a more risky position of banks.    
 
3.4 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
To quantify capital and transparency requirements, we use the approach followed 
by Barth et al. (2001) and more recent studies of the same authors.7 We briefly discuss 
these indices below. Additional information can be found in the Appendix.  
The first index, capital stringency, shows the extent of both initial and overall 
capital stringency. Initial capital stringency refers to whether the sources of funds counted 
as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities and 
                                                 
7 This approach has been also followed by Fernández and González (2005) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), 
among others. An alternative would be to use principal component analysis as in Beck et al. (2006). Barth et 
al. (2004) have followed both approaches, mentioning (p. 218) that “we have confirmed all this paper’s 
conclusions using both methods”. 
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borrowed funds, and whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify these sources. 
Overall capital stringency indicates whether risk elements and value losses are considered 
when calculating the regulatory capital. Higher values of capital stringency indicate more 
stringent capital requirements.  
The second index, market discipline, reflects the degree to which banks are forced 
to disclose accurate information to the public (e.g., disclosure of off-balance sheet items, 
risk management procedures, etc.) and whether there are incentives to increase market 
discipline, for example, via the issuance of subordinated debt and the abolition of deposit 
insurance schemes. Table II reports the descriptive statistics for these variables.  
 
3.5 OTHER BANK- AND COUNTRY-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES 
 We control for a number of bank- and country-level variables (see Table II for 
descriptive statistics and the Appendix for formal definitions of the variables and data 
sources). At the bank level, we control for liquidity using the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets. Liquid assets are cash, government securities (at market value), and balances due 
from other banks.8 Banks with higher liquid assets have a less risky portfolio and thus a 
lower value of non-performing loans. However, these banks may also be less profitable, as 
risk-free assets do not offer yield, and, therefore, high liquidity may be associated with 
lower Z-scores. An additional bank-specific control variable is bank size, proxied by the 
natural logarithm of real total assets. Larger banks are usually more profitable due to 
economies of scale and/or possible market power in loans or deposits. As a result, we 
expect a positive relationship between bank size and the Z-score. Nonetheless, larger banks 
may also have incentive to increase their credit risk if they consider themselves to be in the 
                                                 
8 Therefore, this variable is essentially the inverse of the risk variable RA and, thus, it is not included in the 
RA regressions. However, it can be used as a control variable in solvency and credit-risk regressions. 
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“too-big-to-fail” group of banks. Consequently, the impact of size on credit risk is 
ambiguous. Finally, we also control for bank capitalization (using the ratio of equity capital 
to total assets), loan loss provisions (using the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans), 
and bank growth (a bank’s revenue growth of the last year). These variables capture 
elements of the product market conditions, the health of bank portfolios, and the strategic 
management of banking institutions (see Laeven and Levine, 2009).   
 In connection with the variables pertaining to the institutional, regulatory, and 
macroeconomic environment, we employ an index of economic freedom (obtained from 
the Heritage Foundation). We also control for the level of economic development using the 
real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, for price stability and monetary conditions 
using the inflation rate9 (both these variables are taken from the World Development 
Indicators), and for banking market structure using the 3-bank concentration ratio.   
Finally, we control for restrictions on bank activities through an index we 
constructed using the dataset of Barth et al. (2001, 2004 and 2008). We determined this 
index, named activity restrictions, by considering whether securities, insurance, real estate 
activities, and ownership of non-financial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or 
prohibited (for more information, please refer to the Appendix). The theoretical literature 
has identified both the advantages and the disadvantages of allowing banks to offer a wide 
range of financial services, with emphasis placed on the provision of investment services 
(e.g., Gande, 2008). First, conflicts of interest may arise as banks misstate a borrower’s 
quality and underwrite securities at inflated prices to service outstanding loans, as well as 
misguide their depositors to acquire such securities (e.g., Kang and Liu, 2007). Second, 
banking stability may be undermined as entry into new business lines also gives rise to new 
                                                 
9 We additionally employed as a proxy for the monetary conditions the central bank rate. This variable is 
highly collinear with the inflation rate and the results were quite similar.  
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types of risks for banks (e.g., John et al., 1994; Boyd et al., 1998). On the other hand, the 
preponderance of empirical research not only appears to negate the contention regarding 
the emergence of conflicts of interests (e.g., Ang and Richardson, 1994; Kroszner and 
Rajan, 1994), but also suggests that, in the course of monitoring their loans, banks obtain 
valuable information that places them in a unique position to certify the issuance of 
securities by their clients (e.g., Puri, 1996). Moreover, integrated banks may enjoy 
economies of scale and scope in the combined provision of banking and investment 
services (e.g., Ramírez, 2002) and also become more stable as a result of wider asset 
diversification (e.g., Barth et al., 2004; Angkinand, 2009). We examine which impact 
prevails in the empirical analysis that follows.    
 
4. The Direct Impact of Banking Supervision on Bank Risk  
4.1 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
 Correlations between the variables used in Eq. (1) are not high enough to incur 
multicollinearity problems (see Table III). This is interesting when the audits and sanctions 
variables are considered because it implies that these variables, though positively 
correlated, do not capture the same aspect of enforcement. Moreover, we should note that 
potentially new regulatory initiatives are unlikely to affect the risk-taking behavior of 
banks in the immediate term. If regulations do affect risk-taking incentives, then lags are to 
be expected between the adoption of new banking laws or the implementation of new 
policy initiatives (that will be reflected in the corresponding indices) and the time that these 
laws or initiatives materialize into more sound banking practices. Therefore, the regulatory 
practices of the previous period can be expected to impact the contemporaneous level of 
bank risk. In fact, in the estimations below, we will be using both the first and the second 
lags of the regulation variables to ensure robustness of the results. 
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The potential endogeneity of some of the right-hand-side variables serves as a 
traditional econometric concern in a simple regression of bank risk. In the context of the 
present analysis, these concerns are well justified if one considers that a history of high 
bank risk may force supervisors to improve the quality of enforcement at some point in 
time. The opposite may also be true: in the presence of a prolonged period of prudent risk-
taking bank behavior and a stable financial and economic environment, supervisory 
authorities may become more lax in enforcing banking regulations, thereby raising the 
incentive of banks to increase their risk-taking activities. In these cases, endogenous effects 
prevail, and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Eq. (1) will produce biased 
estimates.  
The fact that risk tends to persist and thus will deviate from equilibrium in the short 
run constitutes another element of potential bias in estimating risk equations (for a 
discussion, see Agoraki et al., 2009). Thus, a static model is biased, the choice of a 
dynamic empirical model (i.e., one that includes a lagged dependent variable) is well 
justified, and the coefficient on the lagged risk variable δ in Eq. (1) may be viewed as the 
speed of convergence to equilibrium. A value of δ statistically equal to 0 implies that bank 
risk is characterized by a high speed of adjustment, while a value statistically equal to 1 
means that the adjustment is very slow. Values between 0 and 1 suggest that risk persists, 
but will eventually return to its normal (average) level. Finally, δ takes implausible 
(negative) values if convergence to equilibrium cannot be achieved, which probably 
indicates a problem with the dataset (e.g., a very small time dimension of the panel). 
Nerlove (2002) offers a more thorough analysis on these issues. 
Given the above, we start with an OLS estimation of Eq. (1), but we resort to the 
system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for inference. Besides 
accounting for the specified dynamics, the latter estimator has two additional virtues. First, 
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it does not break down in the presence of unit roots (for a proof see Binder et al., 2005). 
Second, and most important, it accommodates the possible endogeneity between risk and 
the endogenous right-hand-side variables by means of appropriate instruments.  
The suitability of instruments is a concern in many economic problems and this 
case is no exception. We choose instruments taking two issues into consideration. First, 
one set of instruments has to comply with the identification of the GMM estimation 
method, and second, the other set must be correlated with enforcement but not with bank 
risk. Compliance with the first issue is achieved by using the second lags of the dependent, 
enforcement (audits and sanctions), regulatory, and bank-level variables as instruments (in 
line with Blundell and Bond, 1998 and Bond, 2002).10 Treating these independent 
variables as symmetric instruments (i.e., using the equivalent lags) implies that they are all 
assumed to be endogenous (i.e., reverse causality may prevail), which is in line with the 
theoretical priors discussed above. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002), among 
others, elaborate more on these issues. Finally, we use the first and second lags of the GDP 
per capita and inflation variables as instruments. This treatment of the macroeconomic 
variables (i.e., additionally using their first lag) corresponds to the assumption that banks 
                                                 
10 The regulatory variables may be predetermined or endogenous depending on the sequence of events of the 
game played between banks and regulators. In particular, if banks observe the level and type of regulation 
and then choose their level of risk optimally, regulations should be treated as a predetermined variable. If 
regulations are indeed predetermined, then the first and longer lags of these variables are valid instruments. 
However, it may also be the case that in an effort to prevent financial turbulence, regulators enact new laws at 
the time they observe excess risk-taking. To the extent that the risk-taking of banks explains bank regulatory 
initiatives, this will be reflected in our regulation indices of that particular year. Hence, as the treatment of the 
regulatory variables as endogenous encompasses their treatment as predetermined, we assume that capital 
stringency, market discipline, and activity restrictions are endogenous variables. For further discussion on 
these issues, see Bond (2002). 
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and regulators choose their strategy when they observe the state of the economic 
environment at the beginning of the period (i.e., the macroeconomic variables are treated as 
predetermined). Longer lags of the variables are not included because, in that case, the 
estimated equations are over-identified.  
Compliance with the second principle is achieved by using alternatively as 
instruments (i) the changes in the annual financial freedom index (obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation),11 (ii) the legal origin dummy variables (obtained from La Porta et 
al., 1998, and employed, for example, by Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008), or (iii) changes in 
the three regulatory indices described above. Correlations and simple regressions show that 
all these instruments are statistically valid and estimation results do not vary considerably 
among these three choices. However, we verified that changes in the annual financial 
freedom index is the instrumental variable most strongly correlated with audits and 
sanctions, while it is not correlated with bank risk; hence, it is the one favored. All in all, 
by providing a series of tests, we show that (i) the estimates are robust, (ii) the equations 
are not over- or under-identified, and (iii) the series are not autocorrelated. Finally, besides 
GMM and as a sensitivity analysis, we also employ a panel data instrumental variables (IV) 
regression with fixed effects, where (in line with the issues raised above) we exploit the 
change in the annual financial freedom index as instrument.   
 
4.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Tables IV and V provide the results from estimating Eq. (1). Table IV reports the 
results of the Z-score regressions. Specification (1) is estimated using OLS, specifications 
(2) to (6) using GMM, and specification (7) using the IV method. The OLS regression 
displays low fit (most of the control variables appear statistically insignificant), thus 
                                                 
11 For a similar set of instruments, see Laeven and Levine (2009). 
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contradicting most of our theoretical priors. The results based on the GMM method display 
better fit, while the specification tests imply that the equations are well specified. In 
particular, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable seems to persist to a moderate 
extent, implying that risk will eventually return to its normal (average) level (see 
discussion in Section 4.1)  The Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions rejects the 
relevant hypothesis, thus suggesting that the instruments are valid. Even though some of 
the equations indicate the presence of first-order autocorrelation (AR1), i.e., p-values 
should be below 0.05 for AR to be rejected at the 5% level, this does not indicate that the 
estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency becomes an issue if second-order autocorrelation 
is present (Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, this case is rejected as indicated by the p-
values of the relevant test for AR2 errors. 
In column 2 of Table IV the coefficient on audits shows that on-site examinations 
do not have a significant impact on the Z-index. In the rest of the estimated equations we 
opt for a deeper investigation of this relationship by considering the existence of non-
linearity. Indeed, the results show the relationship between audits and Z-index to be non-
linear (U-shaped). To guarantee robustness of this result, we (i) include a cubic term of 
audits and (ii) drop 10% of the outliers (in terms of standard error) of the relevant variable. 
The results (included in the supplement to the paper) show the cubic term to be 
insignificant, while dropping the outliers has no impact on virtually any of the explanatory 
variables. These findings indicate that non-linearity is not sensitive to the particular non-
linear relationship imposed on the data or to outliers. Higher sanctions, on the other hand, 
have a negative and highly significant effect on bank risk, a finding that remains constant 
among all alternative GMM regressions. We examine whether the pattern in the sanctions-
risk relationship is also non-linear, but find no such evidence as the squared term of 
sanctions is insignificant (see supplement to the paper). In a nutshell, our results offer an 
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unequivocal “yes” to Question 1 as far as the impact of enforcement actions on bank risk is 
concerned and a qualified defense in the form of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
concerning the effect of on-site audits on risk. 
Our results lead to interesting conclusions for policy-makers and supervisors alike. 
In particular, it appears that enforcement actions do have a statistically significant 
disciplinary effect on banks. By imposing direct or reputation costs on banks, supervisory 
sanctions contribute considerably to constraining bank risk. In light of the recent financial 
turbulence, this finding suggests that the benefits of safeguarding the safety and soundness 
of the banking system may outweigh the costs of adopting a more vigorous supervisory 
approach. Moreover, our inference on the inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site 
audits and banking fragility confirms the perception that the frequency of examinations 
holds the key. It seems that on-site audits have a negative effect on risk-taking when the 
number of audits exceeds a certain threshold. This happens either because banks may feel 
they have been placed in the spotlight by supervisors, which essentially increases the 
probability of being subject to enforcement actions (e.g., Berger and Davies, 1998; 
DeYoung et al., 2001), or because the market may become suspicious as a result of the 
intense supervisory scrutiny (e.g., Berger et al., 2000).  
Other factors may account for the initial positive relation between on-site audits and 
risk. First, the market may become suspicious of a bank’s excessive risk after the number 
of audits exceeds a certain threshold. Hence, until that point is reached, the latter may feel 
sheltered from market discipline. Second, on-site audits within a certain frequency 
threshold may be interpreted by banks as a sign of supervisory laxity or/and as an official 
approval of their risk strategy (“certification effect” of supervision). This may encourage 
their risk-taking incentives in search of yield, and may outweigh both stability 
considerations and the deterrent effects of enforcement.        
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Where the rest of the control variables are considered, our findings are close to 
expectations. A higher volume of liquid assets in bank portfolios reduces Z-scores, a result 
probably explained by the two mechanisms that have already been discussed above. First, 
banks that hold a high volume of liquid, low-yield assets are less profitable. Second, a 
moral hazard mechanism may prevail if liquidity requirements are in place. Furthermore, 
bank size is positively related to the Z-index. This shows that larger banks are more 
profitable, presumably due to economies of scale and/or market power.12 In addition, 
revenue growth decreases solvency risk, while the impact of provisioning on this type of 
risk is found to be insignificant. As far as the macroeconomic variables are concerned, 
banks in countries with a high level of development (i.e., with high GDP per capita) are 
assigned a higher Z-index, while high inflation is associated with lower Z-scores. These 
results are intuitive considering that in developed and financially stable countries bank 
insolvency problems are less frequent and fewer resources are employed by banks to 
forecast the future levels of inflation.  
The basic specifications are augmented in column (4) of Table IV by the regulatory 
variables. Our results seem to confirm the research discussed in Section 2, which implies a 
negative correlation between disclosure requirements (market discipline) and bank risk, 
while casting doubt on the effectiveness of capital regulation (capital stringency) as a 
disciplinary mechanism. This is not to say that capital adequacy requirements are 
redundant, but rather that transparency regulation should come at the forefront of 
regulators’ and supervisors’ agendas, as it constitutes the prerequisite layer of and 
supplement for effective banking supervision (of capital requirements) and market 
discipline (Barth et al., 2005; Flannery and Thakor, 2006; VanHoose, 2007). 
                                                 
12 Of course this holds to the extent that bank size is positively correlated with bank market power.  
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Our finding that regulatory restrictions on banking activities tend to reduce risk-
taking appears, on the one hand, to challenge the somewhat prevalent empirical view 
favoring the universal banking model (see the discussion in Section 3.5), but, on the other 
hand, seems to be in harmony with those worried opinions suspecting that the Glass-
Steagall repeal should also be partially blamed for the current financial turmoil (Kuttner, 
2007; Kaufman, 2009). In a recent study, Berger et al. (2010) find that placing restrictions 
on bank activities curtails bank risk. It is worth noting that the economic freedom variable 
in column (4) is positively linked to the Z-index. This implies that, when controlling for 
activity restrictions, increased economic freedom lowers insolvency risk, possibly due to 
increased flows from abroad and better diversification of bank risk.13 
In the last three columns of Table IV we use three different measures of risk instead 
of the Z-index, namely NPL, σ(ROA), and RA. Our main findings on the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between bank risk and audits and on the negative relationship between bank 
risk and sanctions remain practically unchanged. Concerning the impact of the control 
variables, three notable differences in the findings arise when RA is used as the dependent 
variable. First, provisions bear a positive and statistically significant coefficient, implying 
that higher levels of risky assets (lower levels of liquid assets) are associated with heavier 
                                                 
13 Despite the fact that this is probably beyond the scope of the present analysis, we proceed a step further on 
this issue and examine whether the negative relationship between activity restrictions and bank risk holds 
regardless of the level of economic freedom of the countries in our sample. Therefore, we additionally 
estimate an equation that includes an interaction term between the variables activity restrictions and economic 
freedom. The results (with the Z-index as dependent variable) are included in the supplement to the paper and 
suggest that the higher the economic freedom in a country is, the less significant the impact of activity 
restrictions on bank risk. However, we leave it for future research to identify separately the two effects of 
activity restrictions, as set out in Section 3.5, and which one prevails in countries characterized by higher or 
lower economic freedom. 
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provisioning by banks. Second, higher concentration seems to lower the level of risky 
assets in bank portfolios, which may signify some form of strategic interaction between 
large banks in banking sectors that are highly concentrated. Put differently, it is possible 
that in banking sectors with a few large players, banks lower the level of risky assets and 
compensate their expected losses by increases in lending rates or in interest rate margins. 
Third, capital stringency appears for the first time to contain bank risk. In other words, 
higher capital stringency may not have a direct effect on solvency or credit risk, but it 
seems to affect the way banks manage the liquid vs. non-liquid assets in their portfolios. 
This is a finding similar to that of Berger et al. (2010).      
 
4.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we look into the robustness of the results. First, we consider whether 
on-site audits and sanctions have a heterogeneous impact on large banks vis à vis small 
banks. If audits and sanctions are primarily targeted at small or systemically unimportant 
banks, supervisory effectiveness may not be high, even if the number of sanctions and/or 
audits is elevated. To account for this possibility, we split the sample into small and large 
banks and we re-estimate Eq. (1). Large banks are those falling into the top 25% in terms 
of total bank assets in each banking system considered, and small banks are those in the 
lower 25% of the distribution. In this way, we are able to model the relatively important 
players within a single banking industry. We use this as a general rule of thumb because it 
is probably better to consider a uniform rule for all banking systems examined irrespective 
of the general size of banks within a banking industry. Column (1) of Table V shows the 
results for large banks, column (2) the results for small banks. Even though there are some 
changes in the influence of the control variables, the impact of audits and sanctions remains 
the same. This implies that banks, regardless of their size, perceive and internalize 
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supervisory enforcement actions and monitoring efforts in a uniform way. To go a step 
further, we consider whether the impact of audits and sanctions on bank risk differs for 
banks with a high market share (the results are included in the supplement to the paper). 
Again, no such heterogeneity seems to be present.  
Second, instead of the GMM method, we use the panel data IV method with fixed 
effects in column (3) of Table V. This method does not account for the dynamics of risk, 
but is favored by the majority of the relevant literature (see e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
As discussed above, we exploit the change in the annual financial freedom index of the 
Heritage Foundation as instrument. The results and policy recommendations are very 
similar to those of the GMM estimates. The Sargan test is somewhat inferior due to the use 
of a better set of instruments (at least for the present panel) in the differenced equations 
under the Blundell and Bond (1998) method.   
Third, for reasons highlighted in the data section, we employ measures of bank risk 
that focus on the changes in the riskiness of the bank. In particular, in columns (4) and (5) 
of Table V, we use the change of NPL and RA from the previous period as dependent 
variables and our main results are not affected. Therefore, we conclude that bank risk-
taking behavior is short term, as changes in supervisory severity do alter changes in bank 
risk in the same way they alter the level of bank risk. 
Fourth, in columns (6) and (7) of Table V, we explore the possibility that 
supervisory effectiveness has a different impact on bank risk in developed economies 
versus emerging and transition economies. In the latter group we include Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine, which according 
to the World Bank are not high-income countries. The rest of the countries are considered 
developed (high-income countries). The estimated coefficients are somewhat less 
statistically significant, a result attributed to the lower number of available observations. 
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However, our main results carry through in both subsamples, and only audits seems not to 
have a statistically significant impact at the 5% level (statistically significant at the 10% 
level).  Moreover, in column (8) we use information on enforcement actions that aim 
directly at enhancing the safety and soundness of banks, instead of the total number of 
sanctions used in the rest of the empirical analysis. This type of separation is available only 
for Australia, Luxembourg, and the United States, thus leaving us with 35 observations on 
audits and sanctions. Still, most of the main findings of the paper concerning supervisory 
effectiveness carry through. In this case, however, the findings on the regulatory variables 
are inferior, possibly because we are left with very few observations on these variables 
(these variables do not change drastically over time).            
We conclude this section by using the second lags of the regulation variables 
instead of the first lags employed in the estimations so far (the results are reported in the 
supplement to this paper). We find that changes in the coefficients with respect to the 
specifications included in Table IV are negligible, while the same holds for the credit risk 
equation. This is probably due to the fact that there are only minor and gradual changes in 
the regulatory indices over time and that the length of the dynamics is not a crucial element 
in shaping bank risk.  
  
5. The Combined Effect of Banking Supervision and Banking Regulations on Bank 
Risk 
The products of reg with audits and sanctions in Eq. (2) are highly multicollinear 
with the levels of these variables and cannot be included simultaneously in the regressions. 
This is a common problem in studies that employ interaction terms and can be partially 
solved by “centering” the variables. Centering means computing the mean of each 
independent variable and then replacing each value with the difference between it and the 
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mean. After centering the variables, the correlation between the products and their levels 
falls below 0.50. Note that activity restrictions is not interacted with the enforcement 
variables, because we are investigating whether and to what extent the effectiveness of 
banking supervision (Pillar 2 of Basel II) in connection with two specific types of 
regulation constituting the other two pillars of Basel II (capital and disclosure regulation) 
has a bearing on banking stability.  
 
5.1 MAIN RESULTS 
Table VI reports the results obtained from the estimation of Eq. (2). Given the 
analysis of the previous section, we resort only to equations that include both the squared 
term of audits and the regulatory variables, and we only report the results obtained from the 
GMM method. Moreover, we only report estimates of Z-index and NPL regressions, as we 
did not find any changes in the results when using other measures of risk or changes in risk 
measures. Again, the Sargan test shows no over-identifying restrictions and the AR2 test no 
second-order autocorrelation.  
The results in column (1) show that the relationship between effective supervision 
of disclosure requirements (i.e., the product of market discipline and either audits or 
sanctions) and bank risk is negative and statistically significant. The same holds for the 
results of the NPL regression, reported in column (3). This is in contrast to the combined 
effect of banking supervision and capital regulation (i.e., the product of capital stringency 
and either audits or sanctions), which appears insignificant. In addition, the direct impact 
of market discipline on bank risk is negative and significant, capital stringency remains 
insignificant (much like in Table IV), and the variables audits and sanctions have the same 
effect as that reported in Table IV. Thus, in addition to the individual, direct effect of 
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enforcement and market discipline on bank risk, there is also an amplifying combined 
effect of these variables. 
The findings imply an exaggerated regulatory and supervisory interest with capital 
requirements vis à vis transparency regulation. By extension, our work appears to 
contradict the “conventional wisdom” – also reflected in Basel II – concerning the 
effectiveness of capital regulation as a risk-control device and seems to be in line with the 
latest voices that emerged subsequent to the sub-prime crisis placing increasing weight on 
the transparency requirements (e.g., Financial Stability Forum, 2008; IOSCO, 2008; Basel 
Committee, 2009; IMF, 2009). From this perspective, our research validates the criticism 
that Caprio et al. (2008, p. 36) leveled against Basel II for devoting just “16 pages to issues 
of market discipline and 225 pages to spelling out formulas and strategies impeded in pillar 
one and options for national discretion authorized in pillar two”. 
An interesting extension that may save the day for capital regulation would be to 
consider a measure of capital buffers as well as its triple interaction with capital stringency 
and the supervisory effectiveness variables. We measure capital buffers by the distance of 
the capital ratio from the minimum capital requirement of 8%, and we multiply this by -1 
to check precisely whether capital stringency has a positive impact on those banks closer to 
the minimum requirement. Column (2) reports the results, showing that both capital buffers 
(simply named capital in this regression) and the triple interaction are positive and 
statistically significant. This finding is not counterintuitive, nor does it cancel out our main 
inference. On the contrary, it may well be interpreted as supportive of our arguments. 
Banks that are close to the minimum threshold of capital requirements are more likely to 
attract supervisory scrutiny and become subject to disciplinary measures; hence, they are 
under increased pressure to adopt a more prudent behavior. Once more, effective 
supervision seems to constitute a convincing counterbalance against banks’ excessive risk-
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taking. This theoretical explanation seems to be consistent with the point made by Berger 
et al. (2008) and Berger et al. (2010) who suggest that banks receiving comparably the 
worst supervisory safety and soundness ratings adjust towards their target capital ratios in a 
relatively slower fashion, probably because supervisory pressure impedes their access to 
capital markets and prevents them from raising new capital effectively. Essentially, 
therefore, as banks approximate the minimum regulatory capital standards they have 
increasingly stronger incentives to curtail their risk to avoid supervisory intervention.       
The impact of the rest of the control variables is not altered compared with the 
results reported in Tables IV and V. Much like before, the impact of economic freedom is 
positive and statistically significant in the Z-index regressions and negative in the NPL one, 
while higher GDP per capita and lower inflation implies a less risky environment for 
banks. Finally, regarding the bank-level variables, high levels of liquid assets tend to lower 
profits and increase risk, whereas size enters with a positive and significant coefficient in 
the Z-index regressions (negative and significant coefficient in the NPL regression).  
 
5.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
As in Section 4.3, we check the robustness of our main results by (i) estimating our 
model for large and small banks, (ii) using subsamples of developed and emerging 
countries, and (iii) using data on sanctions pertaining only to safety and soundness 
remedial measures. Similar to the results presented in Table V above, it seems that the sign 
and statistical significance of our main results remains unchanged. In particular, the 
coefficients on audits and sanctions are statistically significant when we only use large or 
small banks (see columns 4 and 5), while the impact of the interaction terms remains in line 
with the findings above. Moreover, using subsamples of developed and transition countries 
produces qualitatively similar results, even though the statistical significance slightly falls 
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owing to the reduced number of observations (see columns 6 and 7). The same holds for 
the regression of column (8), where we use data from Australia, Luxembourg, and the 
United States to examine the impact of only those sanctions that are directly related to 
safety and soundness on bank risk: once again the results remain practically unchanged. 
Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the impact of audits and 
sanctions and their combined effect with regulatory indicators are robust to various 
methodological changes. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we distinguish between banking regulation (i.e., law-on-the-books) 
and supervision (i.e., actual implementation of law-on-the-books) and move on to assess 
their individual, stand-alone, and combined effects on bank risk. Furthermore, by 
emphasizing capital and transparency requirements, our work offers an empirical 
assessment of the effect that the interplay among the three Basel II pillars (i.e., Pillar 1: 
capital requirements, Pillar 2: effective supervision, Pillar 3: transparency/market 
discipline) has upon banking fragility. We measure supervisory effectiveness using a panel 
of cross-country data on enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and enforcement actions), 
which allows us to analyze the relationship between regulation, supervision, and risk in a 
more direct manner. 
 We contend that our findings have specific implications for regulators and 
supervisors alike, especially in the aftermath of the current financial turmoil. First, it 
appears that enforcement actions do exert a disciplinary power upon banks, while the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and banking fragility indicates that 
intensifying the frequency of examinations beyond a certain threshold may also constrain 
bank risk. Second, we obtain evidence of a negative relationship between disclosure 
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requirements and bank risk, whereas no such finding is observed for the relationship 
between capital stringency and risk. We do find, however, that increased capital stringency 
lowers the risk for those banks operating close to the minimum acceptable level of capital 
adequacy. Again, the development of a credible threat of supervisory intervention appears 
to be the underlying, driving force behind the disciplinary effect of capital requirements.      
All in all, it seems that effective supervision rather than the mere adoption of 
regulation holds the key in deterring excessive bank risk. Moreover, it appears that 
regulatory persistence with capital adequacy constraints is rather unwarranted and that the 
policy-making agenda should be re-oriented to place more weight on the effective 
implementation of disclosure requirements. Our proposal for more transparency regulation 
and market discipline coincides with the recent comment made by Caprio et al. (2008), 
who suggest that the fundamental goal of supervisors should be to ensure that risks are 
fully understood and fairly priced by investors. Finally, our finding that regulations placing 
restrictions on banking activities are negatively correlated with risk encourages the 
supporters of a Glass-Steagall-type regulation. 
 Our work may provide stimulus for further research in many respects. To begin 
with, obtaining more data on enforcement outputs would allow the classification of our 
results according to legal origins (i.e., common law, civil law, German-Scandinavian legal 
systems) and provide a more direct link and opportunity for interesting comparisons with 
the rest of the law and finance literature employing data from law-on-the-books or 
questionnaires. Moreover, it would be interesting to look into the data on enforcement 
outputs and discern the areas of regulations enjoying less compliance, as well as categorize 
the types of enforcement actions taken by supervisors (e.g., criminal versus administrative 
proceedings) and assess their effect on bank risk. Finally, it would be challenging to 
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combine data on on-site audits and sanctions to construct a new, overall indicator of 
supervisory effectiveness. We leave all these for future research. 
Appendix: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Measurement Source 
Z-index 
This is a proxy for overall bank risk (solvency risk) and it is measured as Z=(ROA+EA)/ σ(ROA), 
where ROA is the ratio of total profits before tax to total assets, EA is the ratio of equity capital to 
total assets and σ(ROA) is the variance of ROA. To calculate σ(ROA) we use ROAt-1 and ROAt-2. 
Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
NPL This is a proxy for credit risk and it is measured by the ratio of problem loans to total loans. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
σ(ROA) This is a proxy for overall bank risk (solvency risk), where ROA is the ratio of total profits before tax to total assets. To calculate σ(ROA) we use ROAt-1 and ROAt-2. 
Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
RA 
This is a proxy for the riskiness of bank portfolios (in terms of credit and liquidity risk) and it is 
measured by the ratio of risky assets (all assets except cash, money in other bank accounts, money 
market mutual funds, and short-term securities) to total assets. 
Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
audits This variable represents supervisory effectiveness and it is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of audits divided by the number of supervised banks.   
Own calculations on the basis of supervisory 
authorities’ annual reports. 
sanctions This variable represents supervisory effectiveness and it is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of sanctions imposed on banks divided by the number of supervised banks.   
Own calculations on the basis of supervisory 
authorities’ annual reports. 
liquidity This variable represents liquidity risk and it is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
bank size This variable is measured by the natural logarithm of real total assets. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
capital This variable represents capitalization and it is measured by the ratio of equity capital to total assets. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
provisions This variable represents the management of provisions and it is measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
revenue growth This is a proxy for the growth of the bank and it is measured by the annual change in total bank revenue. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
concentration This variable is measured by the assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all banks. Own calculations on the basis of Bankscope data. 
economic freedom This is an index of overall economic freedom. Heritage Foundation. 
gdp per capita This is a proxy for economic development and it is measured by real GDP per capita (in million $US). World Development Indicators. 
inflation This is a proxy for the monetary conditions and it is measured by the annual inflation rate (in % terms of the consumer price index). World Development Indicators. 
capital stringency 
This is an index of capital stringency. The variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to 
questions 1-6 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of questions 7 and 8 (i.e., yes=0, 
no =1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle guidelines? (2) 
Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3-5) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of 
the following are deducted from the book value of capital:  (a) market value of loan losses not 
realized in accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign 
exchange losses? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with 
assets other than cash or government securities? (8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with 
borrowed funds?  
Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) database. 
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Appendix (continued) 
market discipline 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, while 
the opposite occurs in the case of questions 8 and 9 (i.e., yes=0, no =1). (1) Is subordinated debt 
allowable (or required) as part of capital? (2) Are financial institutions required to produce 
consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance 
sheet items disclosed to public? (4) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to public? 
(5) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do regulations require 
credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) Is an external audit by certified/licensed auditor a 
compulsory obligation for banks? (8) Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income 
statement while loan is non-performing? (9) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? 
Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) database. 
activity restrictions 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank 
participation in: (1) securities activities (2) insurance activities (3) real estate activities (4) bank 
ownership of non-financial firms. These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited that are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We use an overall index by 
calculating the average value over the four categories.  
Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) database. 
Notes on the database: 
1. As far as EU countries are concerned, (i.e., Luxembourg, Germany, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal, Latvia, Spain, Greece), national definitions of the term 
“bank” comply with the description offered by the Directive 2006/48/EC, OJ L 177/1, Article 4: “Credit institution means: (a) an undertaking whose business is to receive 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; or (b) an electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC”. 
2. “Unofficial” sanctions (e.g., in the form of Memorandum of Understandings, meetings with bank executives and recommendations) are not included in our dataset. Such 
actions are reported on a cumulative basis for US banks and in very few of the rest sample countries (e.g., Luxembourg and Bulgaria), but no further information is provided as to 
their content.  
3. In column (8) of Table V we use information on enforcement actions concerning banks’ safety and soundness. This type of separation is available only for Australia, 
Luxembourg and the United States. For Australia the relevant data is directly accessed from the annual reports of the competent authority (Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, APRA). APRA is specifically responsible for conducting the so-called prudential supervision, that is, monitoring the banking system to ensure its safety and 
soundness, hence the sanctions published in its annual reports correspond to breaches of safety and soundness regulation. For Luxembourg, banking supervision is assigned to the 
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF). The CSSF’s annual reports encompasses quite detailed information on the types and reasons of supervisory 
intervention, thus allowing us to trace those sanctions that more directly aim at ensuring banks’ safety and soundness. In the case of US, on the other hand, the compilation of data 
is based upon a one-to-one collection, elaboration and categorization of supervisory actions, as the latter are reported at the Fed and FDIC websites (see 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/search.cfm> for Fed, and <http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/begsrch.html> for FDIC).  
4. We clean Bankscope data in three ways. First, we use the ‘rank’ module in Bankscope (which ranks the banks within a country according to size) and then we drop non-ranked 
banks to avoid duplications. Second, we need to make sure that the duplication was not due to a merger event. If a bank was not ranked but had assets greater than the country 
average, its history of mergers and acquisitions was examined carefully. Next, the pre-merger banks were re-ranked to ensure that they were included in the dataset, and the post-
merger banks were de-ranked to exclude them from the pre-merger period. Finally, as is standard in studies that use the Bankscope database (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004), 
we employ an outlier rule to the main bank-level variables corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions of the respective variables. This also deletes banks for 
which data on one of the main variables is not available. 
5. All ratios used to construct the variables are left unchanged (i.e. they are not transformed in percentages). The levels of the variables are in million $US. 
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Table I.  Supervisory authorities and average on-site audits and sanctions per bank 
The table lists the supervisory authorities of the countries included in our sample and reports the average number of audits and 
sanctions per bank during the sample period. The table also reports the average total number of supervised banks in each country 
per year during the sample period and the average actual number of banks per year used in this study. 
Country Supervisory authorities 
responsible for the conduct 
of banking supervision 
Audits 
per 
bank 
Sanctions 
per bank 
Average no. 
of 
supervised 
banks 
Average 
no. of 
banks in 
the sample 
Time span of 
dataset 
No. of 
observations 
Australia Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority  
0.83 0.07 257.4 200.7 1999-2008a 10 
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank 0.71 1.55 33.4 28.6 1998-2008 11 
Czech 
Republic 
Czech National Bank 0.28 0.33 43.2 33.8 1998-2008b 10 
Germany (a) Bundesaufsichtsamt für 
das Kreditwesen  
(b) Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
0.14 0.02 2,696.6 2,092.4 1998-2008 11 
Greece Bank of Greece 3.52 0.42 61.8 44.0 2004-2007 4 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority 
0.75 0.02 332.9 207.5 1998-2008 11 
Korea Financial Supervisory 
Service 
9.86 4.06 59.0 50.2 2001-2008c 8 
Latvia Financial and Capital Market 
Commission 
0.60 0.11 54.8 21.6 2001-2008d 8 
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance 
du Secteur Financier 
0.29 2.75 176.1 156.8 1999-2008 10 
Portugal Banco de Portugal 0.28 0.14 64.3 55.2 1998-2008 11 
Romania National Bank of Romania 1.32 1.97 40.5 33.8 1998-2008e 10 
Russia Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation 
1.48 1.92 1,814.2 1,640.0 1998-2008 11 
Serbia (a) National Bank of 
Yugoslavia 
(b) National Bank of Serbia 
0.60 0.66 41.4 37.2 2002-2008 7 
Spain Banco de Espaňa  1.57 0.05 357.8 295.0 1999-2008 10 
Turkey (a) Bankacilik Düzenleme ve 
Denetleme Kurumu 
(b) Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency 
4.00 1.22 77.1 64.5 2002-2008 7 
Ukraine National Bank of Ukraine 3.41 1.01 189.0 145.1 2001-2008 8 
USA (a) Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
(b) Federal Reserve Board 
0.70 0.03 13,531.0 6,028.6 1995-2008 14 
a Data on audits is not available for the period 2006-2008. 
b Data on sanctions is not available for the year 1998. 
c Data on sanctions is not available for the period 2005-2008. 
d Data on sanctions is not available for the period 2001-2002.  
e No data is available for the year 2002. 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics 
The table reports basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
The variables are defined in the Appendix.  
Variable No. of 
observations 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Z-index 16,137 3.450 1.318 -1.260 9.813 
NPL 21,381 0.029 0.048 0.004 0.409 
audits 159 1.540 2.531 0.086 20.254 
sanctions 155 0.850 1.226 0.000 5.533 
liquidity 24,562 0.041 0.050 0.003 0.482 
bank size 25,114 13.01 3.025 10.15 20.17 
capital 24,612 0.090 0.071 -0.220 0.246 
provisions 21,042 0.012 0.020 0.003 0.291   
revenue growth 18,024 0.017 0.255 -0.518 2.090 
concentration 190 0.569 0.368 0.181 0.984 
economic freedom 180 65.14 11.65 37.20 90.60 
gdp per capita 238 13,265.1 13,157.1 589.9 56,358.1 
inflation 238 19.434 76.008 -3.959 1,058.4 
capital stringency 190 5.279 1.265 2.000 8.000 
market discipline 190 6.084 0.967 4.000 8.000 
activity restrictions 190 2.212 0.524 1.250 3.250 
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Table III. Correlations between the explanatory variables 
The table reports correlation coefficients between the independent variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in the Appendix. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. audits 1.000              
2. sanctions 0.485 1.000             
3. liquidity -0.040 0.062 1.000            
4. bank size -0.022 0.181 -0.138 1.000           
5. capital 0.011 0.028 0.135 0.099 1.000          
6. provisions -0.036 -0.029 -0.055 0.070 -0.070 1.000         
7. revenue growth 0.074 0.107 0.082 0.030 0.132 -0.054 1.000        
8. concentration 0.080 0.040 0.018 0.008 0.109 -0.010 0.070 1.000       
9. economic freedom -0.146 -0.249 -0.504 -0.072 -0.010 -0.007 0.042 0.161 1.000      
10. gdp per capita -0.183 -0.030 -0.580 0.090 0.122 -0.043 0.030 0.114 0.555 1.000     
11. inflation 0.050 0.222 0.258 0.230 -0.040 0.070 -0.015 -0.070 -0.511 -0.413 1.000    
12. capital stringency -0.306 -0.036 0.145 0.121 0.185 -0.045 -0.016 -0.058 -0.036 -0.001 -0.094 1.000   
13. market discipline 0.297 -0.046 -0.306 -0.110 -0.003 -0.038 -0.003 0.315 0.418 0.204 -0.321 -0.011 1.000  
14. activity restrictions 0.110 0.177 0.140 0.204 -0.040 0.095 -0.009 -0.209 -0.166 -0.179 0.163 -0.140 -0.090 1.000 
Table IV. The direct effect of on-site audits and sanctions on bank risk (baseline regressions) 
The table presents estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses) on the relationship between bank risk and on-site 
audits and sanctions. Estimation method is OLS (with bank fixed effects) for equation 1, and dynamic panel GMM for the rest of the 
equations. The table also reports the R-squared and Fixed effects (p-value) tests for equation 1, as well as p-values of the Wald test 
for the joint significance of the coefficients, the tests for first (AR1) and second (AR2) order autocorrelation and the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The variables are defined in 
the Appendix. 
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent variable Z-index Z-index Z-index Z-index NPL σ(ROA) RA 
lagged dependent  0.361*** 0.366*** 0.348*** 0.428*** 0.312*** 0.802*** 
  (7.12) (7.25) (6.94) (7.67) (5.21) (13.80) 
audits -0.312* -0.115 -0.382** -0.370** 1.064*** 0.612*** 0.780** 
 (-1.80) (-0.72) (-2.33) (-2.24) (4.13) (3.10) (2.41) 
sanctions 1.755** 1.792** 1.861*** 1.856*** -1.205** -0.955*** -1.122** 
 (2.18) (2.55) (3.03) (2.96) (-2.34) (-2.74) (-2.45) 
audits squared   0.083** 0.087** -0.217*** -0.169*** -0.123** 
   (2.17) (2.22) (-2.70) (-2.99) (-2.09) 
liquidity -0.037 -0.069** -0.070** -0.075** 0.088*** 0.043**  
 (-1.58) (-2.35) (-2.37) (-2.42) (2.88) (2.15)  
bank size 0.092** 0.099*** 0.116*** 0.088*** -0.036* -0.014 -0.020*** 
 (2.42) (2.90) (3.14) (2.84) (-1.76) (-0.96) (-4.05) 
capital     0.049** 0.035*** -0.007 
     (2.22) (2.89) (-0.64) 
provisions -0.052 -0.061 -0.060 -0.065 0.047 0.075 0.004** 
 (-1.38) (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.57) (0.67) (1.19) (2.61) 
revenue growth 0.020* 0.034** 0.038** 0.040** -0.080* -0.111*** 0.006 
 (1.77) (2.10) (2.15) (2.18) (-1.81) (-4.06) (0.04) 
concentration -0.080 -0.470 -0.528 -0.540 0.009 -0.146 -0.303*** 
 (-0.14) (-0.95) (-1.16) (-1.19) (0.15) (-1.02) (-4.02) 
economic freedom 0.018 0.029 0.033 0.056** -0.190** -0.174** -0.220*** 
 (0.67) (1.12) (1.18) (2.20) (-2.37) (-2.09) (-2.71) 
gdp per capita 2.618** 3.095*** 3.150*** 3.006*** -5.004*** -3.458*** -3.004*** 
 (2.47) (3.22) (3.36) (3.11) (-6.12) (-3.30) (-2.82) 
inflation -0.020 -0.051** -0.048** -0.048** 0.110*** 0.086** -0.008*** 
 (-1.62) (-2.20) (-2.16) (-2.17) (3.01) (2.11) (-6.94) 
capital stringency    0.200 0.108 0.029 -0.674*** 
    (0.79) (0.45) (0.43) (-4.93) 
market discipline    0.512** -0.644** -0.916*** -0.834*** 
    (2.09) (-2.22) (-2.70) (-3.97) 
activity restrictions    0.915*** -2.600*** -0.940** -4.267*** 
    (3.62) (-3.15) (-2.60) (-5.30) 
No. of observations 32,137 30,113 30,113 30,113 37,385 30,113 39,889 
R-squared 0.321       
Fixed effects 0.000       
Wald-test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1  0.112 0.103 0.094 0.078 0.103 0.141 
AR2  0.022 0.034 0.020 0.016 0.010 0.029 
Sargan  0.424 0.406 0.400 0.328 0.581 0.140 
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Table V. The direct effect of on-site audits and sanctions on bank risk (sensitivity analysis) 
The table presents estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses) on the relationship between bank risk and on-site audits and 
sanctions. Estimation method is dynamic panel GMM, except from equation 3 for which it is panel data instrumental variables with bank fixed 
effects. The table also reports p-values of the Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficients, the tests for first (AR1) and second (AR2) 
order autocorrelation and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent, 
respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix. Δ in front of NPL and RA (dependent variables in regressions 4 and 5, respectively) 
reflects change over the previous period and all explanatory variables in these specifications are also taken as changes. 
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent variable 
Specification 
Z-index 
Large 
banks 
Z-index 
Small 
banks 
Z-index 
Full sample 
ΔNPL 
Full sample 
ΔRA 
Full sample 
Z-index 
Developed 
countries 
Z-index 
Emerging 
countries 
Z-index 
Safety and 
soundness 
lagged dependent 0.269*** 0.351***  0.377*** 0.649*** 0.277*** 0.338*** 0.265*** 
  (4.13) (6.57)  (4.08) (8.82) (4.16) (5.12) (3.90) 
audits -0.391** -0.353** -0.378** 0.295** 0.819** -0.385** -0.290* -0.341** 
  (-2.42) (-2.10) (-2.18) (2.38) (2.50) (-2.40) (-1.91) (-2.04) 
sanctions 1.901*** 1.877*** 1.762** -0.933** -0.993** 1.545** 1.717*** 1.402** 
  (3.40) (3.10) (2.26) (-2.16) (-2.08) (2.55) (2.70) (2.12) 
audits squared 0.090** 0.085** 0.077** -0.139** -0.208*** 0.071** 0.084** 0.073** 
  (2.27) (2.20) (2.09) (-2.38) (-2.82) (1.98) (2.19) (2.04) 
liquidity -0.059** -0.048* -0.044* 0.073**  -0.061** -0.045 -0.055** 
  (-2.12) (-1.71) (-1.69) (2.40)  (-2.16) (-1.64) (-2.03) 
bank size   0.081** -0.048** -0.035*** 0.080** 0.092** 0.071** 
    (2.33) (-1.99) (-5.21) (2.30) (2.40) (2.03) 
capital    0.062** 0.155***    
    (2.55) (5.33)    
provisions -0.043 -0.030 -0.045 0.006 0.003* -0.060 -0.084* -0.055 
  (-1.03) (-0.89) (-1.30) (0.07) (1.95) (-1.48) (-1.71) (-1.43) 
revenue growth 0.051** 0.030** 0.024* -0.046 0.002 0.038** 0.068*** 0.031** 
  (2.33) (1.97) (1.84) (-0.92) (0.00) (2.14) (2.70) (1.98) 
concentration 0.027 -0.363 0.003 0.037 0.034 -0.039 0.628 0.006 
  (0.03) (-0.84) (0.00) (0.48) (1.39) (-0.18) (1.25) (0.02) 
economic freedom 0.065** 0.013 0.016 -0.204* -0.188** 0.044* 0.063** 0.031 
  (2.39) (0.50) (0.60) (-1.85) (-2.30) (1.81) (2.35) (1.56) 
gdp per capita 2.748*** 2.055** 2.610** -4.002*** -2.975*** 2.657** 2.422** 2.506** 
  (2.63) (2.16) (2.30) (-4.02) (-2.88) (2.55) (2.30) (2.44) 
inflation -0.023 -0.058** -0.032* 0.231*** -0.006*** -0.021 -0.050** -0.019 
  (-1.65) (-2.30) (-1.79) (4.85) (-4.41) (-1.62) (-2.18) (-1.57) 
capital stringency 0.228 0.274 0.195 0.203 -0.622*** 0.250 0.125 0.223 
  (0.91) (1.29) (0.66) (1.21) (-3.83) (1.02) (0.40) (0.88) 
market discipline 0.598** 0.296 0.494** -0.707** -0.821*** 0.507** 0.628** 0.463* 
  (2.57) (1.20) (1.96) (-2.18) (-3.45) (2.05) (2.51) (1.78) 
activity restrictions 0.802*** 0.650* 0.910*** -2.518*** -4.104*** 0.846*** 0.981*** 0.678* 
  (2.91) (1.91) (3.40) (-2.99) (-4.99) (3.10) (4.04) (1.94) 
No. of observations 7,528 7,528 32,137 33,042 35,610 24,692 5,421 17,164 
R-squared   0.291      
Fixed effects   0.000      
Wald-test 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
AR1 0.196 0.069  0.120 0.092 0.102 0.095 0.081 
AR2 0.025 0.041  0.036 0.025 0.027 0.040 0.040 
Sargan 0.417 0.603 0.133 0.280 0.310 0.452 0.510 0.388 
 
Table VI. The combined effect of regulation and enforcement on bank risk 
The table presents estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses) on the combined effect of regulation and enforcement on 
bank risk. Estimation method is dynamic panel GMM. The table also reports p-values of the Wald test for the joint significance of the 
coefficients, the tests for first (AR1) and second (AR2) order autocorrelation and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The variables are defined in the Appendix. In equation 2 the variable 
capital is replaced by a measure of capital buffers (i.e., distance of the capital ratio from minimum capital requirement), and the interaction 
terms with audits and sanctions are replaced with the product of capital buffers with audits or sanctions and capital stringency. 
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 
Dependent variable Z-index Z-index  NPL Z-index Z-index Z-index Z-index  Z-index 
Specification Full 
sample 
Capital 
buffers 
Full 
sample 
Large 
banks 
Small 
banks 
Developed 
countries 
Emerging 
countries 
Safety and 
soundness  
lagged dependent 0.330*** 0.344*** 0.417*** 0.281*** 0.342*** 0.303*** 0.397*** 0.267*** 
  (6.25) (6.98) (9.90) (4.33) (7.01) (5.74) (6.92) (4.04) 
audits -0.392** -0.345** 3.301*** -0.379** -0.348** -0.366** -0.272* -0.313** 
 (-2.50) (-2.05) (2.86) (-2.36) (-2.04) (-2.21) (-1.83) (-1.98) 
sanctions 1.874*** 1.846*** -0.817** 1.943*** 1.855*** 1.616*** 1.803*** 1.592*** 
 (3.01) (2.93) (-2.35) (3.67) (2.98) (2.80) (3.14) (2.71) 
audits squared 0.106** 0.079** -0.044*** 0.081** 0.079** 0.083** 0.086** 0.075** 
 (2.65) (1.99) (-3.16) (2.05) (1.99) (2.06) (2.10) (1.97) 
liquidity -0.067** -0.061** 0.063** -0.061** -0.051* -0.056** -0.041 -0.051* 
 (-2.44) (-1.98) (2.38) (-2.18) (-1.72) (-2.04) (-1.59) (-1.88) 
bank size 0.097*** 0.096*** -0.031   0.077** 0.092** 0.070** 
 (3.10) (3.07) (-1.62)   (2.20) (2.36) (1.99) 
capital  0.083*** 0.046**      
  (3.03) (2.17)      
provisions -0.04 -0.029 0.063 -0.046 -0.023 -0.058 -0.080* -0.053 
 (-1.12) (-0.88) (0.97) (-1.35) (-0.80) (-1.44) (-1.68) (-1.40) 
revenue growth 0.033** 0 .046** -0.090** 0.041** 0.048** 0.032** 0.065** 0.030** 
  (2.09) (2.53) (-1.94) (2.36) (2.55) (2.03) (2.61) (1.97) 
concentration -0.38 -0.517 -0.006 0.148 -0.511 -0.012 0.701 0.002 
 (-0.66) (-1.27) (-0.04) (0.25) (-1.24) (-0.18) (1.49) (0.01) 
economic freedom 0.071*** 0.068** -0.221** 0.070** 0.011 0.046* 0.060** 0.03 
 (2.71) (2.62) (-2.65) (2.45) (0.64) (1.82) (2.32) (1.55) 
gdp per capita 3.014*** 3.027*** -5.116*** 3.040*** 2.027** 2.650** 2.427** 2.518** 
 (3.09) (3.16) (-6.45) (3.46) (2.06) (2.50) (2.28) (2.38) 
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inflation -0.044** -0.045** 0.173*** -0.025 -0.047** -0.030* -0.052** -0.018 
  (-2.03) (-2.06) (5.22) (-1.52) (-2.06) (-1.69) (-2.19) (-1.41) 
capital stringency 0.223 0.244 -0.11 0.199 0.241 0.214 0.129 0.231 
 (0.81) (1.22) (-0.67) (0.78) (1.12) (0.77) (0.43) (0.90) 
market discipline 0.644** 0.650** -0.797** 0.503** 0.349 0.522** 0.620** 0.451* 
 (2.37) (2.42) (-2.44) (2.05) (1.65) (2.10) (2.47) (1.83) 
activity restrictions 0.918** 0.910** -2.569*** 0.932*** 0.647* 0.851*** 0.955*** 0.691** 
  (2.49) (2.42) (-3.18) (3.73) (1.90) (3.14) (3.82) (1.99) 
0.039 0.649** -0.156 -0.026 0.045 0.03 0.05 0.01 audits*capital 
stringency  (0.23) (2.25) (-1.33) (-0.17) (0.25) (0.18) (0.28) (0.08) 
0.820* 0.803* -0.399*** 0.943** 0.803* 0.982** 0.714 0.848** audits*market 
discipline (1.90) (1.86) (-3.01) (2.18) (1.86) (2.16) (1.61) (1.97) 
0.347 0.982*** -0.317 0.302 0.36 0.218 0.403 0.203 sanctions*capital 
stringency (0.89) (2.97) (-0.92) (0.69) (0.97) (0.66) (1.11) (0.61) 
1.010*** 0.947*** -1.888*** 1.147*** 0.947*** 0.905*** 1.148*** 0.862** sanctions*market 
discipline (3.11) (2.95) (-3.69) (3.39) (2.95) (2.78) (3.36) (2.56) 
No. of observations 30,113 30,113 37,385 7,528 7,528 24,692 5,421 17,164 
Wald-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR1 0.087 0.069 0.106 0.049 0.069 0.082 0.086 0.049 
AR2 0.025 0.045 0.035 0.009 0.145 0.023 0.040 0.020 
Sargan 0.562 0.504 0.702 0.602 0.587 0.302 0.284 0.333 
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